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Comment
Courts v. Governors: Prisoners Torn
Between States: Who should
determine their fate?
I. Introduction
When a prisoner is facing a death sentence in one state and
a lesser sentence in another state, should the prisoner be re-
quired to complete the lesser sentence before being executed? Is
the order of the prisoner's convictions a relevant consideration?
Are the personal views of each governor relevant?
This Comment suggests that a prisoner should not be re-
quired to complete a sentence other than death before being ex-
ecuted. Furthermore, the order of a prisoner's convictions and
the personal views of the governors should not be relevant con-
siderations. However, under the current interpretation and ap-
plication of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act,'
("IADA"), these two factors are relevant and often dictate the
prisoner's future.2
There are two logical interpretations of the IADA. First,
the courts can construe it as remedial, with its main purpose as
1. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L. No. 91-538, Stat. 1397
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. 1 (1994)). For a review on the objec-
tives of the IADA see 18 U.S.C. app § 2 practice commentary. For a discussion of
the history and detailed function of the IADA, see Leslie W. Abramson, The Inter-
state Agreement of Detainers: Narrowing its Availability and Applications, 21 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 1 (1995).
2. See discussion infra parts III.A., III.B., W.C.
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uninterrupted prisoner rehabilitation.3 The legislative history4
of the IADA and relevant case law5 support this proposition.
Accordingly, a court could reasonably find that when a prisoner
is sentenced to death, that prisoner no longer has an interest in,
and will not benefit from, programs of treatment and rehabilita-
tion.6 Therefore, the return provisions of the IADA would not
apply and the prisoner would not be required to serve any sen-
tence prior to execution. 7 Alternatively, the legislature could
amend the IADA by adding a death penalty exception.
This Comment discusses the procedural problems that re-
sult when a person commits murder in more than one state and
only one of those states sentences him to death. Part II pro-
vides the background of the mechanism used to transfer prison-
ers between states. Part II also summarizes the IADA, its
legislative intent and the case law interpreting it. Part III dis-
cusses four cases illustrating the IADA's function when prison-
ers contest their return to one of the jurisdictions where they
committed a crime. The controversy that surrounded convicted
double-murderer Thomas J. Grasso is also discussed in Part III,
including the procedural history in New York, Oklahoma and
the federal courts. Part IV analyzes and critiques the Federal
District Court's opinion in Coughlin v. Poe,8 in which New York
sought Grasso's return. Part IV also provides a practical inter-
pretation of the IADA. Finally, this Comment concludes with a
suggestion to amend the IADA to prevent divergent political
views from causing a controversy similar to the one that sur-
rounded Grasso.9
3. See discussion infra part II.B.1.
4. See discussion infra part II.A.
5. See discussion infra part II.B.1 and note 68.
6. See Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982
(1991); People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
871 (1991); People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010
(1987); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1010 (1986).
7. See discussion infra part III.A.
8. 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
9. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1994).
156 [Vol. 16:155
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/9
1995] COURTS v. GOVERNORS
II. Background
A. Legislative History
1. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act was enacted by
Congress in 1970 and adopted by the forty-eight contiguous
states and the District of Columbia. l0 The basic purpose of the
IADA is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of
any and all detainers" based on untried indictments, informa-
tions or complaints outstanding against a prisoner.12 The party
states adopted this purpose because outstanding charges
against a prisoner "produce uncertainties which obstruct pro-
grams of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation."13
Article II of the IADA provides definitions of relevant terms
such as "state," "sending state" and "receiving state."14 Pursu-
ant to Article III of the LADA, the prisoner has the power to
make a request for a final disposition of any outstanding
charges against him.15 The official who has custody over the
prisoner must issue a certificate noting the prisoner's current
status.' 6 The prisoner then must include this certificate with
his request. 7 After the prosecuting officer of the receiving state
10. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. I.
11. As used in the context of the IADA, a detainer is a "notification filed with
institution in which [a] prisoner is serving a sentence, advising [him] that he is
wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." BLAcies LAw Dic-
TIONARY 449 (6th ed. 1990).
12. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. I.
13. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. II. Article II states that:
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a State of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; the District of Co-
lumbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending State" shall mean a State in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to
article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability is
initiated pursuant to article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving State" shall mean the State in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to article III or article IV
hereof.
Id.
15. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. III (d).
16. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. III (a).
17. Id.
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receives these documents, he has 180 days to try the prisoner.'8
According to Article III(e), any such request constitutes a
waiver of extradition. 19 It also acts as a consent by the prisoner
to return voluntarily to the original place of imprisonment.20
Finally, Article III(e) states that "[niothing in this paragraph
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if other-
wise permitted by law."21
The power to invoke the IADA is not solely in the hands of
the prisoner.2 Article IV also gives the receiving state power to
invoke the IADA.23 Pursuant to Article IV(a), the receiving
state is entitled to have a prisoner, against whom it has lodged
a detainer, made available upon presentation of a written re-
quest for temporary custody.24 Before the request is honored,
the governor of the sending state has thirty days, either upon
his own motion or that of the prisoner, to disapprove the re-
quest.25 Article IV(c) provides that a "[t]rial shall be com-
menced within one hundred and [sic] twenty days of the arrival
of the prisoner in the receiving State ....- 26
Article V(a) provides that after either the prisoner or the
receiving state makes a request, the sending state shall offer
the receiving state temporary custody to facilitate a speedy and
efficient prosecution.27 Temporary custody refers to the time
needed to prosecute the outstanding charges.28 Article V(e) re-
quires that "[alt the earliest practicable time consonant with
the purposes of [the IADA], the prisoner shall be returned to the
sending State."2 In the meantime, "the prisoner [is] deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the
sending State."30 Pursuant to Article VIII, the IADA becomes
18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. III (e).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IV.
23. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IV (a).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V (c).
27. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V (a).
28. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V (d).
29. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V (e).
30. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V (g).
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binding upon a party state when the state adopts it.3' Article IX
states that the IADA "[s]hall be liberally construed so as to ef-
fectuate its purposes."32
2. Legislative Intent
The IADA allows prisoners to obtain prompt resolution of
detainers placed against them by other jurisdictions.M As a re-
sult, prisoners can secure a greater degree of certainty as to
their future sentences.3 4 Without certainty, prisoners fre-
quently do not take advantage of institutional opportunities,
and therefore, behavioral problems often result.35 Certainty en-
ables prison authorities to plan more effectively for the prison-
ers' rehabilitation and return to society.36
Prisoners not afforded this certainty are seriously disad-
vantaged.37 Since prisoners who are transferred between states
often are kept in close custody, they are ineligible for desirable
work assignments. 38 Additionally, prisoners with outstanding
detainers "sometimes [lose] interest in institutional opportuni-
ties because [they] must serve [their] sentence[s] without know-
ing what additional sentences may lie before [them], or when, if
ever, [they] will be in a position to employ the education and
skills [they] may be developing."3 9 "Even [prisoners] who par-
ticipate [in rehabilitation and treatment programs] do so under
great psychological disadvantage because they do not know
what lies before them, nor whether the skills or education they
are obtaining may be applied within a reasonable time."4°
31. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. VIII.
32. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IX.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. at 5.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 3.
38. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1970).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 5.
1995] 159
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B. Case Law
1. Judicial Interpretation of the IADA: Why it was
Adopted and its Purposes
The United States Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Mauro,41 held
that the United States is a party to the IADA and may act as
either a sending or a receiving state.42 The Court further held
that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum43 is not a de-
tainer within the meaning of the IADA." In deciding issues re-
lated to prisoner transfers, the Court looked into the history of
the IADA.45 The Court determined that Congress' core concern
was its "desire to alleviate the problems encountered by prison-
ers and prison systems as a result of the lodging of detainers."46
Accordingly, the IADA is remedial in character and should be
construed liberally in favor of the prisoners.47
The Council of State Governments outlined some problems
it sought to ameliorate through the IADA.48 The Council stated
that "prison administrators were 'thwarted in [their] effort[s]
toward rehabilitation [because t]he [sic] inmate who has a de-
tainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and
frequently does not respond to a training program.' 49 The
Mauro Court further noted that "prisoner[s] [were] often de-
41. 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
42. Id. at 354.
43. A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is used by a court "when it is
necessary to bring a person who is confined for some other offense before the issu-
ing court for trial." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Mauro, at 361.
45. Id. at 349-61.
46. Id. at 356. Congress was further motivated to enact the IADA to aid
states in obtaining federal prisoners. Id. See also People v. Esposito, 37 Misc. 2d
386, 392, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960) (stating that the
people who contributed to the proposals resulting in the enactment of the IADA
were primarily concerned with the planning and carrying out of programs for pris-
oner rehabilitation).
47. U.S. ex rel. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 836 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing State
v. West, 79 N.J. Super. 379, 384, 191 A.2d 758, 760 (1966); People v. Esposito, 37
Misc. 2d 386, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (1960)); See also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,
449 (1981) (noting that a primary purpose of the IADA is to protect prisoners who
have detainers outstanding).
48. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359.
49. Id. (quoting CoUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGIsLA-
TION PROGRAM FOR 1957, at 74 (1956)).
Black's Law Dictionary defines "detainer" as a request "filed by criminal jus-
tice agency with institution in which prisoner is incarcerated, asking institution
160
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prived of the ability to take advantage of many of the prison's
programs aimed at rehabilitation, merely because there was a
detainer lodged against [them]."50 Moreover, the Council found
that the existence of an outstanding detainer caused judges to
hesitate to sentence defendants to long prison terms that were
otherwise appropriate.51
Congress drafted the IADA in an effort to eliminate the ad-
verse effects of long term detainers.52 These adverse effects in-
clude a denial of privileges within the prison, such as placement
in training programs and more relaxed work environments. 53
Officials frequently lodged detainers against prisoners which
would remain in place without any action taken on them.54 As a
result, prison authorities denied certain privileges to those pris-
oners, thereby frustrating rehabilitation efforts. 55
In United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes,56 the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals determined that the IADA addresses the
problems prisoners experience with outstanding criminal
charges from another jurisdiction.57 The court noted that un-
certainty about future sentences causes prisoners psychological
strain and inhibits their desire to take advantage of institu-
tional opportunities.58 The court concluded that the IADA is re-
medial in nature and should be construed liberally in favor of
either to hold prisoner for agency or to notify agency when release of prisoner isimminent." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990)).
50. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359.
51. Id. at 360.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 359.
54. Id. at 360.
55. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360. Prisoners that have detainers lodged against
them are filled with anxiety and apprehension and are often kept in close custody
thereby barring them from
'treatment such as trustyships, moderations of custody and opportunity for
transfer to farms and work camps. In many jurisdictions [he is] not eligible
for parole; there is little hope for [their] release after an optimum time pe-
riod of training and treatment, when [they are] ready for return to society
with an excellent possibility that [they] will not offend again. Instead,
[they] often becomes embittered with continued institutionalization and the
objective of the correctional system is defeated.'
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720 (1985)(quoting COUNCIL OF STATE GovERN-
MENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR 1957, at 74 (1956)).
56. 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975).
57. Id. at 836.
58. Id. at 837.
1995]
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prisoners.5 9 In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to
Article IX of the IADA which states that the "agreement shall
be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes."60
When prisoners are uncertain about their future, they lose
motivation to rehabilitate themselves.61 As a result, the entire
purpose of the penal system, which is to transform inmates into
law-abiding citizens, is defeated. 62 , Thus, the court stated that
the purpose of the IADA is to "minimize the adverse impact of a
foreign prosecution on rehabilitative programs of the confining
jurisdiction."6
The court in United States v. Harris6 4 construed the IADA
as having two purposes.6 5 Its first purpose is to minimize dis-
ruption of prisoner participation in treatment and rehabilita-
tion programs.6 6 Its second purpose is to expedite the
disposition of outstanding charges against prisoners.67 In ac-
cordance with the requirement that the JADA be liberally con-
strued, several courts have employed one or both of the
purposes in deciding LADA cases.68
59. Id. at 836 (quoting State v. West, 191 A.2d 758, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1966)).
60. Groomes, 520 F.2d at 836 n.20 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:159A-9)
(West 1995).
61. Groomes, 520 F.2d at 837, n.21.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 836-37.
64. 566 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 612.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See also Fex v. Michigan, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 1092 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the primary purpose of the IADA is to provide efficient
means for resolving and alleviating the anxiety and apprehension caused by out-
standing detainers); Yellen v. Cooper, 828 F.2d 1471, 1473-74 (10th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the IADA is intended to remedy hardships of prisoners caused by
outstanding detainers and the protections of the IADA are designed to advance a
prisoner's rehabilitation and to avoid disruptions of that rehabilitation); Kerr v.
Finkbeiner, 757 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the purpose of the
IADA was to protect prisoners from being denied prison privileges and rehabilita-
tion efforts when detainers were filed against them); United States v. Bryant, 612
F.2d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1979) (maintaining that the primary purpose of the IADA is
to encourage minimum interference with rehabilitative programs) cert. denied, 446
U.S. 920 (1980); United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting
that the purposes of the IADA are to preserve a defendant's right to a speedy trial
and to minimize disruption of a prisoner's rehabilitation); Rhodes v. Schoen, 574
F.2d 968, 969 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the basic purpose of the IADA is to
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/9
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2. States can Lawfully Circumvent the Provisions of the
IADA
a. The Governor's Power and Options Under the
Current Construction of the IADA
Governors have several options under the IADA.69 Pursu-
ant to Articles I and IX, which encourage cooperative proce-
dures, the governors of the sending and receiving states can
enter into an executive agreement.70 The agreement can pro-
vide for the prisoner's return to the sending state only if the
prisoner is not sentenced to death in the receiving state.7 1 For
example, in Moon, the court upheld an executive agreement al-
lowing the receiving state to retain custody of the prisoner
when he was sentenced to death.7 2
Article IV(a) of the IADA gives the governor of the sending
state the power to disapprove a request for temporary custody.73
The governor of a sending state may opt to retain a prisoner
despite a contrary desire by the prisoner or receiving state.7 4
Similarly, a governor can be uncooperative by refusing to enter
into an executive agreement. 75
preserve a prisoner's right to a speedy trial and to "prevent interference with his
participation in treatment and rehabilitation programs."); Camp v. United States,
587 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that sanctions in Article IV(e) of the
IADA are intended to prevent excessive interference with a prisoner's rehabilita-
tion); Gale v. United States, 391 A.2d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that "the
primary purpose of the IAD[A] is to encourage the expeditious disposition of
charges pending against a prisoner in another jurisdiction and. . . to minimize the
adverse impact of foreign prosecutions on rehabilitative program...
69. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. I, IX, MV(a).
70. People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783, 803 (Ill. 1990). An executive
agreement in the context of the IADA is an agreement voluntarily entered into by
two or more states that have charges outstanding against a prisoner. Id. The
agreement generally provides for who will have jurisdiction over the prisoner in
the instance where the receiving state imposes the death penalty. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IV (a).
74. See id.
75. Letter from Mario Cuomo, former Governor of New York, to David Wal-
ters, former Governor of Oklahoma (Oct. 11, 1993). The former governor of New
York, Mario Cuomo, refused to enter into an executive agreement with the former
governor of Oklahoma, David Walters, and demanded that Grasso be returned to
New York to serve a minimum of twenty years in New York prisons. Id.
9
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State constitutions also give governors broad powers.76 For
example, the New York State Constitution provides that:
The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commuta-
tions, and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason
and cases of impeachment upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations as he may think proper, subject to
such regulation, as may be provided by law relative to the manner
of applying for pardons. 77
Reprieves 78 do not relieve a prisoner of a sentence. 79 The pris-
oner must be returned to the sending state regardless of the
sentence imposed by the receiving state.8 0 Therefore, a reprieve
is not an effective tool for circumventing the return provision of
the IADA.8 ' A governor of a sending state could, however, com-
mute8 2 the prisoners sentence, thereby substituting the receiv-
ing state's sentence for the sending state's sentence.83
Similarly, a governor may grant a pardon, which is an executive
action that sets aside and releases the offender from punish-
ment.8 4 By either granting a pardon or commuting a sentence,
the governor of a sending state can effectively release a prisoner
to be executed in a receiving state.8 5
76. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
77. Id.
78. "Reprieve" is defined as:
Temporary relief from or postponement of execution of criminal punishment
or sentence. It does no more than stay the execution of a sentence for a
time, and it is ordinarily an act of clemency extended to a prisoner to afford
him an opportunity to procure some amelioration of the sentence imposed.
BLACi's LAw DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 78.
81. See supra note 78.
82. "Commutation" is defined as "[a]lteration; change; substitution; the act of
substituting one thing for another." BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 280 (6th ed. 1990).
83. Id. Thus, with regard to Thomas Grasso, Mario Cuomo could have com-
muted Grasso's New York sentence. See supra text accompanying note 77.
84. BLAces LAw DICTIONARY 569 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, with regard to Thomas
Grasso, Mario Cuomo could have pardoned Grasso thereby releasing him from any
debt he owed to New York. Upon his release from prison in New York, Grasso
would be sent immediately to Oklahoma, pursuant to the IADA, to serve his sen-
tence previously imposed by the State of Oklahoma. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V. See
supra text accompanying note 77.
85. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V. Former Governor Mario Cuomo insisted that
Grasso be returned to New York, the sending state. Robert B. McFadden,
Oklahoma Death Row Inmate Is Returned To New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993,
164 [Vol. 16:155
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b. Judicial Alternatives to Governor Intervention
The sentencing court of a sending state has two options
that allow the receiving state to obtain jurisdiction. First, while
the prisoner is still in the receiving state, the court could vacate
the sentence and then immediately reinstate the same sen-
tence. 6 As a result, the receiving state would technically have
the first conviction and control of the prisoner under the current
construction of the IADA. Second, the court could vacate the
sentence and then re-sentence the prisoner, allowing its sen-
tence and the receiving state's sentence to run concurrently.87
Thus, the prisoner's execution in the receiving state would sat-
isfy the sentence of the sending state.
III. The [ADA and Its Inconsistent Results
A. Cases Where the Courts Found Provisions of the IADA
Inapplicable
In People v. Guest,s8 the defendant, Anthony Guest, was im-
prisoned in Missouri when Illinois obtained custody over him.8 9
The prisoner still had the following sentences outstanding:
(1) life imprisonment imposed in 1978 and a consecutive 35-year
sentence imposed in 1979, both in Missouri; (2) concurrent terms
of 20 years and 11-29 years imposed in 1979 and a consecutive
§ 1, at 49. Governor Cuomo, a strong opponent of the death penalty, claimed he
was motivated not by his opposition to the death penalty but rather by "his loyalty
to the letter of the law." Id.
86. Telephone Interview with John O'Neal, Chief Public Defender (Oct. 10 ,
1994); John O'Neal represented Grasso in Oklahoma. As Chief Public Defender,
Mr. O'Neal spends most of his time fighting to save the lives of people like Thomas
Grasso. Grasso, however, disrupted O'Neal's normal routine when Grasso in-
formed O'Neal that he wanted the death penalty and wished to waive any and all
rights he may have had to appeal a sentence of death. Since O'Neal personally
opposes the death penalty, he was faced with several moral and ethical problems.
For a discussion of O'Neal's background and the moral dilemma caused by his rep-
resentation of Grasso see Matt Siegel, Defending A Death Wish, Am. Law., April
1993, at 60. For a further discussion of the ethical problems of John O'Neal and
other attorneys similarly situated, i.e., attorneys representing clients that are fac-
ing the death penalty, see Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses From the Death
Penalty: 'Old Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REv. 1 (1994).
87. See People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d 84, 85 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County
1994) (the court refused to change Defendant's New York sentence to run concur-
rently with his Oklahoma sentence).
88. 503 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1986).
89. Id. at 274.
11
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term of 30 to 35 years also imposed in 1979, both in Tennessee;
(3) 15 years to life, plus a consecutive determinate enhancement
term of 3 years in California, imposed in 1981, to be served con-
secutively with the sentences in Missouri.90
The State of Illinois subsequently sentenced Guest to die by le-
thal injection.91
On appeal, the prisoner argued that he should be returned
to Missouri to complete his Missouri prison term pursuant to
his "Request for Disposition of Indictments in Illinois and Cali-
fornia, and copies of Acceptance by those jurisdictions .... "92
Guest further claimed that failure to honor his request to be
returned to Missouri violated his due process and equal protec-
tion rights.93 The court held that the return provisions of the
LADA do not apply when the receiving state sentences the pris-
oner to death.94 In citing Articles I and V of the IADA 95 , the
court said, "[wie have grave doubts, however, that these provi-
sions were intended to apply where, as here, a sentence of death
is imposed by the receiving state."96
In Moon v. State,97 the prisoner shot and killed a person at
Brown's Tavern in Chattanooga, Tennessee.98 This murder oc-
curred on November 15, 1984.99 On November 24, 1984, Moon
then traveled to Catoosa County, Georgia where he shot an-
other in the head. 1°° Moon then returned to Chattanooga on
December 1, 1984, robbed Peeper's Adult Bookstore, and kid-
napped yet another person.1 1 Moon sodomized his captive and
90. Id.
91. Id. at 275.
92. Id. at 274.
93. Guest, 503 N.E.2d at 274.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 274. Article I states that it is the policy of the party states and
purpose of the IADA to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of out-
standing charges that produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation. Article V provides that "[alt the earliest practicable
time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned
to the sending state." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. V.
96. Guest, 503 N.E.2d at 275 (emphasis added).
97. 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1991).
98. Id. at 445.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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threatened to kill him if he refused to submit. 102 On December
2, 1984, while Moon was in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, he offered a
ride to Darryl Ehrlanger and her fiance Thomas DeJosa.10 3 Just
outside of Gatlinburg, Moon tried to drag Ehrlanger out of the
car.10 4 When DeJosa attempted to help her, Moon shot him.' °5
Moon subsequently ended DeJosa's life by shooting him three
more times.106 On December 14, 1984, the Tennessee police ar-
rested Moon. 0 7
In February of 1987, Moon began serving a life sentence in
Tennessee. 0 8 The district attorney handling the Georgia case
filed detainers and a request for temporary custody pursuant to
the LADA.' 09 The governors of Tennessee and Georgia signed
an agreement providing for Moon's return to Tennessee if Moon
did not receive the death penalty in Georgia. 0
Georgia sentenced Moon to death for murder."' Moon ar-
gued that the IADA required his return to Tennessee to com-
plete his sentences before execution in Georgia. 112 However, the
Supreme Court of Georgia found that nothing in the IADA re-
quires the invalidation of the agreement signed by the respec-
tive governors." 3 Thus, Georgia was permitted to retain Moon
and proceed with his execution." 4
In People v. Pitsonbarger,1 5 the prisoner, Jimmy Ray Pit-
sonbarger, admitted killing two residents of Illinois. 1 6 Pit-
sonbarger further admitted that after the killing, he also killed
a man in Columbia, Missouri. 17 From Missouri, Pitsonbarger
drove to Reno, Nevada where he solicited a prostitute, Mary
102. Moon, 375 S.E.2d at 445.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Moon, 375 S.E.2d at 445.
108. Id. at 446.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 444-45.
112. Moon, 375 S.E.2d at 447.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 568 N.E.2d 783 (M. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991).
116. Id. at 787.
117. Id. at 788.
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Lou Quayle. l 18 Quayle testified that Pitsonbarger raped her,
tried to strangle her, and ultimately shot her in the head. 119
Shortly thereafter, Pitsonbarger surrendered to the Nevada
police.120
Illinois obtained custody of Pitsonbarger pursuant to the
IADA,121 and subsequently sentenced him to death.122 Pit-
sonbarger argued that under the IADA, Illinois had temporary
custody of him only for the purpose of a trial. 1  Moreover, Pit-
sonbarger argued that he should be returned to Nevada to com-
plete his life sentence. 2 4 However, the governors' agreement
provided for Pitsonbarger's return to Nevada only if he did not
receive the death penalty in either Illinois or Missouri.125  The
Supreme Court of Illinois stated that a prisoner who received
the death penalty in a receiving state no longer had an interest
in programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation provided
by the sending state. 1m Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois, relying on Guest 27 and Moon,ms held that the return pro-
visions of the IADA do not apply when the receiving state has
imposed the death penalty and when the sending and receiving
states have signed an executive agreement. 29 Thus, Illinois
was permitted to retain custody of Pitsonbarger and to proceed
with his execution despite the fact that he did not complete his
Nevada prison term. 30
In Gall v. Commonwealth,'3 ' Eugene Williams Gall pro-
tested his return to Kentucky, the sending state, where he was
sentenced to death. 3 2 Originally, Kentucky officials transferred
Gall to Ohio to stand trial for rape and abduction charges. 133
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 568 N.E.2d at 788.
121. Id. at 802.
122. Id. at 786.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 568 N.E.2d at 803.
126. Id. at 802-03.
127. Guest, 503 N.E.2d at 255.
128. Moon, 375 S.E.2d at 442.
129. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d at 803.
130. Id.
131. 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
132. Id. at 43.
133. Id.
[Vol. 16:155168
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/9
COURTS v. GOVERNORS
Gall claimed that the transfer violated the IADA because he did
not have an opportunity to petition the governor of Kentucky to
disapprove Ohio's request for temporary custody.134 As a result,
Gall claimed that Kentucky lost jurisdiction over him, and
therefore was not allowed to proceed with his execution. 135
The Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed with Gall that his
transfer violated the IADA.'3 The court disagreed, however,
that Kentucky lost jurisdiction over Gall solely because of the
violation. 37 The court stated that pursuant to Article V(7) of
the IADA, the prisoner is deemed to remain in the custody of
the sending state.l- Gall's case did not invoke the primary pur-
pose of limiting transfers which is to "prevent the interruption
of the rehabilitative function of the penal system." 39 Since
Kentucky sentenced Gall to death, he will not benefit from reha-
bilitation.14° Therefore, the purpose behind limiting transfers is
inapplicable.'4'
B. The Thomas Grasso Controversy
Some people said, "He did a New York crime; he should do
the New York time." 42 While others said, "Give it to him;
maybe even torture him a little bit."'4
On December 24, 1990, Thomas Grasso murdered Hilda
Johnson, an eighty-seven year old Oklahoma woman.144 Grasso
went to the victim's home with an intent to rob her. 45 When
Grasso entered Ms. Johnson's home, he choked her with an ex-
tension cord taken from her Christmas tree.1 He hit the vic-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). Also, Gall was not allowed the opportunity to
file a writ of habeas corpus under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 44.
140. Id.
141. 702 S.W.2d at 44.
142. No Right To Die, NEWSDAY, May 15, 1993, at 20.
143. Graham Rayman, Death Divides Them; Execution pits brother vs.
brother, NEwSDAY, Oct. 12, 1993, at 3.
144. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 804 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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tim with an iron and a piece of wood, then he took a few dollars
and a television set that he later pawned for $125. 147
On July 3, 1991, he murdered Leslie Holtz, an eighty-two
year old man in New York. 148 Grasso had been smoking crack
cocaine and wanted to get money to buy more drugs.149 When
Grasso entered the hall of the Staten Island boarding house
where he lived, he noticed that Mr. Holtz was entering his own
room. 150 When Mr. Holtz opened the door, Grasso pushed him
inside and choked him with the cord from the television. 151
Grasso continued to choke the victim until he was dead. 152 The
victim was found in a kneeling position, with face and head
trauma and an electrical cord wrapped five times around his
neck. 153
On April 21, 1992, Grasso pled guilty to murder in the sec-
ond degree and was sentenced to twenty years to life imprison-
ment. 54 He began serving his sentence at the Sing Sing
Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York. 155 On July 8,
1992, the District Attorney of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, filed a
detainer against Grasso and requested temporary custody of
him.156 The District Attorney filed the detainer pursuant to an
information 57 filed against Grasso on August 15, 1991, charg-
ing him with first degree burglary and first degree murder.58
The Superintendent of the Sing Sing Correctional Facility,
notified Grasso of the Oklahoma information and advised him of
his right to request a final disposition of that information. 59
Grasso made such a request on July 14, 1992.160 Pursuant to
Article III(e) of the TADA, Grasso's request acted as a "consent
147. Id.
148. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 88-89.
149. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 809 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 89.
153. Id. at 88.
154. Id. at 85.
155. Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
156. Id.
157. "[Aln accusation exhibited against a person from some criminal offense,
without an indictment." BLAcK's LAW DIcrioNARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990).
158. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 587.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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to be returned to the original place of imprisonment."161 New
York officials subsequently transferred Grasso to Oklahoma
where he would stand trial on the Oklahoma charges. 62
On September 28, 1992, Grasso pled guilty to murder 63 in
Oklahoma and requested the death penalty. 64 The Oklahoma
court sentenced Grasso to 500 years imprisonment on the rob-
bery conviction and death by lethal injection on the murder con-
viction. 6 5 Grasso made a motion to expedite sentence review
and expressed his desire to waive the mandatory right to appeal
so his execution would not be delayed. 66 On November 23,
1992, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stayed the exe-
cution date of December 4, 1992, pending its mandatory sen-
tence review. 167 However, the court ultimately found that the
death penalty was properly imposed and Grasso knowingly, in-
telligently and voluntarily waived his right to a direct appeal. 68
Accordingly, on July 15, 1993, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed Grasso's death sentence. 69
On August 5, 1993, New York filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. 70
New York sought a declaratory judgment to support its position
that Oklahoma must return Grasso to New York.' 71 Grasso's
execution date was set by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals for October 19, 1993.172
New York argued that the purpose of the IADA is the "ex-
peditious and orderly disposition of the outstanding charges." 173
New York claimed that the purpose was satisfied, since
161. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. I1(e).
162. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 588.
163. Id.
164. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d at 805.
165. Id.
166. Id,
167. Id.
168. Id. at 810.
169. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 588.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 590.
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Oklahoma prosecuted Grasso. 174 Thus, Oklahoma was required
to return Grasso to New York under Article V(e) of the IADA.175
Oklahoma argued that the IADA was designed to benefit
the prisoner by facilitating the prisoner's "treatment and reha-
bilitation,"176 pursuant to Article I of the IADA.177 Oklahoma
further stated that because it imposed the death penalty,
Grasso no longer had an interest in New York's prisoner treat-
ment and rehabilitation programs.178  Thus, Oklahoma con-
cluded that the return provisions of the IADA did not apply. 179
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma adopted a "plain language" analysis of the JADA and
quickly rejected Oklahoma's argument.180 The court upheld the
principle that a court's function is to interpret the law as en-
acted by the legislature and not to legislate from the bench.' 8'
The court noted that the plain meaning of a statute controls
when the words are clear and unambiguous except in "'rare
cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its
drafters.' "182
174. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 590.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. I. See supra note 95.
178. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 590.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 589.
182. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 589 (quoting UTE Distribution Corp. v. U.S., 938
F.2d 1157, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 904, 112 S. Ct. 2273, 119 L.
Ed 2d 200 (1992) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564, 571,
102 S. Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L. Ed.2d 973 (1982))). A fundamental canon of statutory
construction is that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the stat-
ute itself. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58
(1990). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then the plain language
controls the interpretation of the statute. Ute Distribution Corporation v. United
States, 938 F.2d 1157, 1162 (1991). Although the language of a statute is unam-
biguous, its plain meaning will not control if "the literal application of [the] statute
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters...."
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982). Accordingly, the
intentions of the drafters would control in that situation. Id. The courts have re-
served some power for themselves to adopt a restricted rather than a literal mean-
ing of the words where accepting the literal meaning "'would thwart the obvious
purpose of the statute.'" Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571
(1965)). Therefore, "interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd re-
172
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The IADA states that temporary custody means custody of
a prisoner only for the purpose of permitting prosecution of the
outstanding charges. 1m The court, strictly construing the IADA
stated that temporary custody does not mean custody for the
"purpose of service or execution of sentence in the receiving
state."184 The court held that the IADA required Oklahoma to
return Grasso to New York to complete the New York sentence
before Oklahoma could proceed with Grasso's death sentence.185
The court further noted that Grasso could not waive his re-
turn to New York, because the "question of jurisdiction and cus-
tody of prisoners is essentially one of comity 86 between the
member states and not a personal right of prisoners."18 7 The
court did, however, acknowledge that the IADA's emphasis on
"cooperative procedures" authorized New York to enter into an
agreement with Oklahoma to waive the return of Grasso. 88 As
a result of the court's holding, Grasso's execution was stayed
eleven hours before it was scheduled to occur.'8 9 When in-
formed that his execution would not proceed as planned, Grasso
responded, "'My whole day is totally ruined.' "190
Oklahoma relied on Guest,191 Moon, 92 and Pitsonbarger93
to support the position that it could retain jurisdiction over
Grasso because Oklahoma sentenced him to death.' 94 In those
cases, the receiving state obtained custody of the prisoner pur-
suant to the IADA and subsequently sentenced him to death. 195
sults are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative
purpose are available." Griffin, 458 U.S. at 575.
183. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 590.
184. Id. at 591.
185. Id.
186. "Comity" is defined as "[clourtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to
grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will."
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
187. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 592.
188. Id. at 592-93.
189. Sam Howe Verhovek, For Murderer, a 'Tomb' Before His Death, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1995, at B5.
190. Id.
191. People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (11. 1986).
192. Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988).
193. People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783 (11m. 1990).
194. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 591. Grasso also took the position, agreeing with
Oklahoma. See generally Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585 (1993).
195. See supra part III.A.
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The prisoners argued that the IADA required their return to
the sending state to complete their sentences before execu-
tion. 96 The courts disagreed. 197
"The rationale of the courts in rejecting the prisoners' argu-
ments was two-fold."198 First, the courts determined that Arti-
cle V(e) of the IADA does not apply when the prisoner is
sentenced to death in the receiving state. 99 Second, the courts
in Moon and Pitsonbarger relied on the fact that the sending
and receiving states entered into "cooperative arrangements re-
garding the custody of the prisoners."200 Therefore, the court
distinguished these cases because Oklahoma and New York did
not enter into a cooperative arrangement. 20
Oklahoma, however, still sought custody of Grasso.20 2 To
do so it needed either a waiver by New York of its right to have
Grasso returned under the IADA or a commutation of the New
York sentence.20 3 Mario Cuomo, the governor of New York, re-
fused to take any action that would give Oklahoma custody of
Grasso. 20 4 Grasso then requested the New York sentencing
court to set aside the New York sentence and reinstate it to run
concurrent with or consecutive to the Oklahoma sentence. 20 5
The sentencing court gave great deference to the governor's
decision and refused to alter it without a showing of constitu-
tional infirmity.20 6 The court noted that legal disputes should
"be decided upon sound legal reasoning and not influenced by
the pressure of public sentiment."2 7 The court further acknowl-
edged the dichotomy between the public policies surrounding
the death penalty in both New York and Oklahoma.208 Finally,
the court stated that re-sentencing "would be tantamount to fa-
196. See supra part III.A.
197. See generally People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (fll. 1986), People v. Pit-
sonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783 (Ill. 1990), Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988).
198. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 592.
199. Id.
200. Id. For discussion of Guest, see Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 592 n.4 (1993).
201. Id. at 85-86.
202. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 85-86.
207. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 86.
208. Id. at 89.
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cilitating State-sponsored suicide in direct contravention of
[New York's] clear policy considerations regarding the death
penalty."2o9
On November 8, 1994, George Pataki was elected governor
of New York. During his campaign, he held a news conference
outside the boarding house where Leslie Holtz was murdered.210
There, Pataki promised to send Grasso back to Oklahoma to
face execution for the murders he committed.211 On January 11,
1995, eleven days after Pataki took office, Grasso was en route
to McAlester prison, the site of Oklahoma's death row,212 and on
March 20, 1995 at 12:22 a.m., Grasso was executed by lethal
injection.213
IV. Analysis
A. Interpretation of the IADA
The courts in Guest, Moon, and Pitsonbarger, held that the
return provision laid out in Article V of the IADA should not
apply when a prisoner is sentenced to death in the receiving
state.214 The rationale for those holdings was that once a pris-
oner receives the death penalty, he no longer has a recognizable
interest in treatment and rehabilitation programs. 215 The Gall
court applied Article V, but in that case the prisoner was sen-
tenced to death by the sending state. 216 The Gall court noted
that the purpose of the IADA is to limit transfers, thereby
preventing the interruption of rehabilitation programs. 217
Thus, it held that when a prisoner is sentenced to death, the
rationale of limiting transfers to prevent interruptions in reha-
bilitation no longer applies.218
209. Id.
210. Kevin Sack, New York Transfers Killer To Oklahoma To Await Execu-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1995, at B8.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. John Kifner, Inmate is Executed in Oklahoma, Ending N.Y Death Pen-
alty Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, § A, at 1, col. 3.
214. See supra part IH.A.
215. See supra part III.A.
216. See supra discussion of Gall part IIIA.
217. See supra discussion of Gall part III.A.
218. See supra discussion of Gall part IIIA.
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The Oklahoma District Court in Poe219 adopted a "plain lan-
guage" analysis and held that a sending state retains jurisdic-
tion over a prisoner although the receiving state sentenced him
to death. 220 The court stated that "[tihe eradication of the ad-
verse side-effects attendant to a detainer is merely the by-prod-
uct of the achievement of the purpose of the Act-disposal of
untried charges."221 Essentially, the court viewed the IADA's
function of facilitating prisoner treatment and rehabilitation
programs as merely incidental to the Act's purpose of disposing
of untried charges. 222
The drafters of the IADA, however, wanted a statute that
would facilitate programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilita-
tion.223 In fact, the interruptions in prisoner rehabilitation
caused by outstanding detainers were the motivating force be-
hind the enactment of the IADA.224 The drafters found that
prisoners who were uncertain about their future were at a great
psychological disadvantage in terms of rehabilitation. 225 Ac-
cordingly, the intention of the drafters was to create a statute
for the benefit of the prisoners. 226
The Supreme Court of the United States supports the in-
tention of the drafters.227 In U.S. v. Mauro,228 the court noted
that a core concern behind the enactment of the IADA was Con-
gress' "desire to alleviate the problems encountered by prison-
ers and prison systems as a result of the lodging of detainers."229
The IADA is a remedial statute and must be construed liberally
in favor of prisoners.230
Consequently, the court in Poe should have recognized that
a purpose of the IADA is to facilitate prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Both the legislative history of the ADA and
219. Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
220. Id. See also supra part III.B.
221. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 591.
222. Id.
223. See supra part IIA.2.
224. See supra part U.A.2.
225. See supra part II.A.2.
226. See supra part U.A.2.
227. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. Also, see generally U.S. v.
Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
228. 436 U.S. 340 (1978).
229. Id. at 356.
230. See supra note 68.
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case law support this proposition. 23 1 In accordance with the leg-
islative intent behind Article IX and the holding of U.S. v.
Mauro, the IADA should be construed liberally to further its re-
medial purpose.23 2
Similarly, the court in Poe could have relied on basic princi-
ples of statutory construction. A court should not adopt the lit-
eral meaning of the words of a statute if that meaning "'would
thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.'"233 Moreover, "inter-
pretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are
to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the
legislative purpose are available." 234
Despite the availability of alternative interpretations of the
IADA, the Oklahoma District Court chose to disregard them.23 5
The court could have found that the purpose of the LADA was to
facilitate programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation 236
and therefore, when Oklahoma sentenced Grasso to death, that
purpose was frustrated. Alternatively, New York should have
waived its right to have Grasso returned. 23 7
Grasso and Oklahoma, however, were not without recourse
to have Grasso returned to Oklahoma. Grasso petitioned the
Richmond County Supreme Court to vacate the New York judg-
ment and reinstate the New York sentence to run either concur-
rent with or consecutive to the Oklahoma sentence. 238 As part
of his reasoning, Grasso argued that it would be cruel and unu-
sual punishment to force him to serve his New York sentence
before execution. 239 The court correctly rejected this argu-
ment.24° It stated that a sentence of twenty years to life is not
231. See supra parts I.A.2, H.B.1.
232. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IL (providing that "[the IADA] shall be liberally
construed so as to effectuate its purposes."). Id.
233. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (quoting
Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)).
234. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 575.
235. 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
236. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
237. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 592.
238. People v. Grasso, 162 Misc. 2d at 85.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 86.
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cruel or unusual and a subsequent death sentence does not al-
ter that conclusion. 241
B. A Practical Interpretation of the IADA
The three leading cases, Guest,242 Moon,243 and Pit-
sonbarger,244 dealing with issues similar to those in Poe,245 each
permitted the receiving state to retain custody of the prisoner
when the receiving state sentenced him to death.246 In each
case, the receiving state sentenced the prisoner to death, while
the sending state imposed a sentence other than death.247 De-
spite a violation of the IADA, the court in Gall248 allowed the
sending state to require Gall's return for execution.249
Unlike Grasso, defendants Guest, Moon, and Pitsonbarger
all wanted to return to their sending states to complete their
term sentences before returning to their receiving states to face
execution.250 Similarly, Gall wanted to stay in the receiving
state to serve his term sentence before execution.251
The former governor of New York, Mario Cuomo, believed
that life imprisonment is a more severe punishment than a
death sentence. 252 Despite the large number of capital defend-
ants who elect execution at some point during their imprison-
ment, few stand by their decision. 253 Contrary to Cuomo's
241. See also Cobb v. State, 260 S.E.2d 60, 69 (Ga. 1979) (rejecting a pris-
oner's argument that the death penalty would constitute cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, as applied to him, because he would be compelled to serve his "50-year
minimum sentence in the Florida penal system before the death sentence could be
carried out, and he could not attempt to contest the legality of the Florida convic-
tions without exposing himself to the possibility that, if he were successful, he
would immediately be put to death.").
242. People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1986).
243. Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988).
244. People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783 (111. 1990).
245. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
246. For a discussion of the three cases, see supra part III.A.
247. See supra part III.A.
248. 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
249. Id. For further comment, see supra part III.A.
250. See supra part LA.
251. 702 S.W.2d 37, 45 (Ky. 1985).
252. Cuomo Says Grasso Makes Case for Him, NEWSDAY, Oct. 16, 1993, at 21.
253. Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853
(1987). See also Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012 (1976); Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966)(per curiam); Hays v. Murphy, 663
F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981); State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992); Franz v.
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belief, some prisoners fight to be sent to the state where they
are not facing a death sentence because they would rather live
in prison than die.25 4 Similarly, other prisoners do not contest
their return to a jurisdiction where they must serve a prison
term.255 Thomas Grasso was the exception.
In addition to cooperating with a fellow governor by al-
lowing Grasso to stay in Oklahoma, Mario Cuomo could have
viewed this situation as an opportunity to save the taxpayers of
New York some money. The Commissioner of the New York
State Department of Correctional Services said, "Grasso's incar-
ceration [would] not cost New Yorkers an extra cent" because
"[olne inmate [would] not affect the hiring or firing of one cor-
rection officer or civilian employee."256 The estimated cost to
keep Grasso in prison for one year would have been $24,300 or
approximately $486,000 for twenty years.257 Additionally, there
are several other inmates living in New York prisons, also at a
cost of $24,300 per inmate per year, who immediately upon
completion of their New York prison term will be sent out of
state for execution.258 The cost to New York taxpayers to house
ten prisoners for twenty years, for example, is $4,860,000. Ac-
cordingly, New York's policy of retaining prisoners that are to
be executed upon their transfer from the New York penal sys-
tem to the penal systems in other states costs New York mil-
lions of dollars.25 9
Arkansas, 754 S.W.2d 839 (Ark. 1988); People v. Chadd, 621 P.2d 837 (Cal. 1981);
Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. 1980); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86 (Wash.
1992).
254. See supra part III.A.
255. New York retains several prisoners that are to be executed upon their
release from the New York prison system. For example: Cam Ly, who was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death in Pennsylvania, was returned to New
York to finish his prison term and then returned to Pennsylvania in 1988 to await
execution; Kevin Mathews will be sent out of state for execution upon completion
of his New York prison term; William Branshaw and Ernest Laurencio will both be
sent to Florida for execution upon completion of their New York prison terms; and
Joseph Fischer, who is not eligible for parole in New York until 2004, will be sent
to Oklahoma for execution upon completion of his New York prison term. Thomas
A. Coughlin, III, Why Tom Grasso Belongs Behind New York Bars, NEWSDAY, Oct.
29, 1993, at 68 [hereinafter Coughlin].
256. Coughlin, supra note 255.
257. Dennis Cauchon, N.Y. Stops Okla. Execution Wants To Imprison Killer,
USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 1993, at 1A.
258. See supra note 255.
259. See infra part IV.C.
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Death penalty opponents, however, argue that the delays in
execution, costs thereof, and dangers of executing an innocent
person greatly outweigh any benefit obtained by the death pen-
alty.260 Common in death penalty cases are substantial delays
caused by the appeal process.26 1 In many states, the cost to exe-
cute one prisoner is often three times the cost to house one pris-
oner for life. 262 Moreover, the danger of executing an innocent
person is too great a risk to justify imposing the death penalty
upon anyone. 263
Although these arguments are powerful, they do not apply
to the Thomas Grasso controversy. First, the only delays
caused by the appeal process were due to a mandatory review
because Grasso waived any and all rights he had to appeal his
death sentence. 264 Second, the cost of Grasso's execution falls
entirely upon Oklahoma. 265 Third, Grasso admitted that he
committed both murders, 266 and therefore, there was no risk of
executing an innocent person.
C. The Current IADA v. an Amended IADA
Equipping the IADA with a death penalty exception will
take away a governor's unfettered discretion to manipulate a
prisoner's fate based on his or her personal beliefs. Under the
current construction of the IADA, as Thomas Grasso's case il-
lustrates, a prisoner's punishment can change based solely
upon the current governor.267 For example, former Governor
Mario Cuomo, an opponent of the death penalty,268 refused to
cooperate with the governor of Oklahoma, David Walters, and
260. Michael D. Hintze, Attacking The Death Penalty: Toward A Renewed
Strategy Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 395, 410-14
(1993).
261. Id. at 411-12.
262. Id. at 413.
263. Id. at 399.
264. Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 805 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
265. If Grasso remained in New York, the cost of maintaining him in prison
would be $24,300 per year. By executing him, Oklahoma incurs no further cost of
imprisonment but is required to pay for the execution.
266. Grasso v. State 857 P.2d 802, 804 (Okla. Crim. App.1993).
267. See generally Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
268. While Governor of New York for twelve years, Mario Cuomo vetoed capi-
tal-punishment bills twelve times. Liz Trotta, N.Y. Resists Death Penalty Trend;
Lawmakers Want It, but Two Governors Have Held Out, WASH. TIMES, July 27,
1994, at A3.
180 [Vol. 16:155
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss1/9
COURTS v. GOVERNORS
required Grasso to serve a minimum of twenty years in New
York.269
Former Governor Cuomo claimed "[pioliticians should not
overrule judges and interstate compacts."270 However, overrul-
ing was not necessary. First, Chief Judge Seay explicitly au-
thorized New York to waive any rights it had with regard to
Grasso.271 Second, the IADA directs the states that have
adopted the LADA to cooperate with each other in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the IADA.272 Cooperation between mem-
ber states is achieved by the respective governors entering into
executive agreements. 273 When the residents of New York
elected George Pataki on November 8, 1994, there was a change
in the New York governor and a subsequent change in the view
of the death penalty. As a result of that political change,
Grasso's sentence changed dramatically.
1. Current Status and Operation of the IADA
A few examples will illustrate the problems and inconsis-
tent results of a plain reading of the IADA.
Scenario 1:
State A, the sending state, does not have the death penalty.
State B, the receiving state, does have the death penalty.
X commits murder in both states.
State A convicts X of murder and sentences X to life
imprisonment.
Pursuant to the IADA, State B obtains temporary cus-
tody of X, convicts X of murder and sentences X to death.
Result: X must complete his term of life imprisonment in
State A before execution in State B. The order of the convic-
tions dictates which state obtains jurisdiction absent an exec-
utive agreement to the contrary.
It must be noted, however, that the order may be meaning-
less. Although State A, the sending state, does not have the
269. Kevin Sack, New York Transfer: Killer to Oklahoma to Await Execution,
N.Y. Tmdis, Jan. 12, 1995, p.1 .
270. Robert D. McFadden, Killer from Oklahoma Applauds Cuomo's Defeat,
and Waits, N.Y. TImES, Nov. 13, 1994, § 1, at 48.
271. Poe, 835 F. Supp. at 593.
272. See supra part IIA.1.
273. See supra part III.A.
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death penalty, the governor of State A may personally favor the
death penalty and agree with the governor of State B, the re-
ceiving state, to allow X to remain in State B for execution.
Conversely, the governor of State A may oppose the death pen-
alty and demand X's return. Thus, X may or may not be exe-
cuted, depending upon the personal views of the governor of the
sending state.
In any event, X can seek judicial intervention. The courts
of State A can "technically" give State B the first conviction by
vacating X's conviction and immediately reinstating it. Alter-
natively, the courts of State A could vacate X's sentence and
then order X's sentence imposed by State A to run concurrently
with State B's sentence. Therefore, the result demanded by a
plain reading of the JADA can be changed indiscriminately.
Scenario 2:
State A, the sending state, does not have the death penalty.
State B, the receiving state, does have the death penalty.
X commits murder in both states.
State B convicts X of murder and sentences X to death.
Pursuant to the IADA, State A obtains temporary cus-
tody of X, convicts X of murder and sentences X to life
imprisonment.
Result: State B retains jurisdiction over X and can exe-
cute Y X will not serve time in State A.
The IADA in its current condition creates a race to convic-
tion. The state that obtains the first conviction and, as a result,
becomes the sending state under the IADA, is in the "driver's
seat" and indiscriminately can manipulate X's ultimate fate.
The governor of State B could make an agreement with the gov-
ernor of State A to have X serve State A's sentence prior to exe-
cution in State B. However, that is an unlikely result. If the
general purpose of the LADA is the facilitation of prisoner treat-
ment and rehabilitation programs, then State B will consider
that purpose as frustrated once state B sentences X to death.
Alternatively, if the purpose of the IADA is the expeditious and
orderly disposition of charges outstanding against a prisoner,
then State B will consider that purpose satisfied when X stands
trial in State A. Although State B rightfully will retain jurisdic-
tion over X and proceed with X's execution, it does so based
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solely on the timing of the respective convictions. This creates
the race to conviction.
As illustrated above, each scenario produces a different re-
sult. In the first scenario, the personal views of the governor of
the sending state dictate the result. In the second, the timing of
the convictions creates a dissimilar outcome. Why should X re-
ceive a different sentence when X commits the same crimes and
receives the same trials and sentences? Moreover, why should
X's fate depend on the personal views of subsequent governors
of the sending state? This paper suggests that X's ultimate sen-
tence should not rest upon either. A judge and jury should de-
termine X's sentence. The magnitude of X's sentence should be
the determinative factor regarding jurisdiction over the
prisoner.
2. A New Approach: The Death Penalty Exception
Equipping the IADA with a death penalty exception would
provide consistent results in the sentencing and execution of
prisoners. Furthermore, an exception would remove governors'
unfettered discretion to manipulate a prisoner's sentence based
on their personal views. The IADA should be amended to pro-
vide that when a state sentences a prisoner, it retains jurisdic-
tion over the prisoner as long as the prisoner is sentenced to
death.
What about the debt that the prisoner owes for the crimes
committed in the other state? There are two responses to this
question. First, under the current construction of the IADA, a
prisoner need not serve any other sentences. 274 As illustrated in
Scenario Two, a prisoner who is sentenced to death in a sending
state and then receives a lesser sentence in a receiving state
will not serve time in the receiving state.275 Second, the death
penalty is the greatest punishment that the penal system can
impose, and, therefore, it subsumes all other lesser sentences.
Implementing a death penalty exception would provide a
default provision. When a state imposes the death penalty, it
automatically retains jurisdiction over the prisoner. The order
of the convictions no longer would be relevant once a prisoner is
274. See supra discussion of People v. Pitsonbarger part III.A.
275. See supra part HI.A.
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sentenced to death. If neither state sentences the prisoner to
death, then the exception does not apply. Moreover, the excep-
tion would remove the danger that a prisoner's ultimate fate
may be manipulated by a governor's personal views regarding
the death penalty. This proposal would cure the current ail-
ments of the IADA.
A few examples will illustrate how the LADA would operate
if it contained a death penalty provision.
Scenario 1:
State A, the sending state, does not have the death penalty.
State B, the receiving state, does have the death penalty.
X commits murder in both states.
State A convicts X of murder and sentences X to life
imprisonment.
Pursuant to the IADA, State B obtains temporary cus-
tody of X, convicts X of murder and sentences X to death.
Result: The death penalty exception is activated and ju-
risdiction over X defaults to State B.
Thus, the term of life imprisonment is subsumed into the death
penalty and State B can carry out X's execution without requir-
ing X to complete his sentence first in State A.
Scenario 2:
State A, the sending state, does not have the death penalty.
State B, the receiving state, does have the death penalty.
X commits murder in both states.
State B convicts X of murder and sentences X to death.
Pursuant to the IADA, State A obtains temporary cus-
tody of X, convicts X of murder, and sentences X to life
imprisonment.
Result: The death penalty exception is activated and ju-
risdiction over X defaults to State B.
In both scenarios, X will not serve time in State A but rather
will remain in State B to await execution. The results in scena-
rios 1 and 2 are consistent with each other. Neither result de-
pends on the timing of the convictions nor on the personal views
of the governor of the sending state. The results are based upon
the fact that X received the greatest punishment that the penal
system can impose, the death penalty. Thus, the results are
based upon a meaningful and predictable measure, as opposed
to the timing of the convictions or the personal views of the cur-
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rent governor. The death penalty exception is not a radical
amendment. The results of the two scenarios are acceptable
under the IADA and provide a logical and consistent means of
ensuring uniformity. 76
But is a death penalty exception relevant to New York in
light of its recent acceptance of the death penalty?277 Is a death
penalty exception relevant if all the states adopt the death pen-
alty as a form of punishment? The answer to both questions is
yes. A death penalty exception would still be relevant and use-
ful to determine which state would retain jurisdiction of a pris-
oner who committed crimes in more than one state.
Furthermore, a death penalty exception removes these jurisdic-
tional issues from gubernatorial discretion. Therefore, the ex-
ception would prevent personal ethics and values from
determining a prisoner's fate as illustrated in the Grasso
case.
278
V. Conclusion
Generally when a person commits murder in more than one
state and one of those states imposes the death penalty, there is
no controversy between the various states provided that the
governors' views are similar. When governors do not agree on
policy issues such as the death penalty, animosity results. The
dispute between former governor David Walters and former
governor Mario Cuomo in their battle over the custody of
Thomas Grasso illustrates such animosity. Although Grasso re-
quested the death penalty and resolutely wanted to die, Gover-
nor Cuomo insisted that Grasso serve his twenty years to life, at
the expense of the New York taxpayers, before going to
Oklahoma to face execution.
276. The results created by adding a death penalty exception are acceptable
under the current IADA because a prisoner will not serve a term sentence imposed
upon the prisoner by any receiving state when the prisoner was sentenced to death
in the sending state. A death penalty exception would provide the same result
when a prisoner is sentenced to death in a receiving state, i.e., the prisoner will not
serve any of the term sentences imposed upon the prisoner by the sending state or
any other jurisdiction.
277. Kevin Sack, New York Transfer: Killer to Oklahoma to Await Execution,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 12, 1995, pl.
278. See Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Okla. 1993); see also supra
part III.B.
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The current construction and interpretation of the IADA al-
low different variables to manipulate a prisoner's ultimate sen-
tence. Those variables are the order of the prisoner's
convictions, the personal views of each governor, and the gover-
nors' willingness to cooperate with one another. The latter two
variables are based largely upon political views and pressures
and should not be factors that determine a prisoner's ultimate
sentence.
Therefore, a death penalty exception is necessary for the
IADA to produce consistent results and to eliminate governors'
unfettered discretion in this area. The death penalty exception
automatically will provide that when a state sentences a person
to death, that state retains jurisdiction over the prisoner re-
gardless of the order of the prisoner's convictions, the personal
views of the governors, and the governors' cooperation. This
new approach will serve the purposes of the IADA and provide
consistent results based on the sentence the prisoner receives
rather than on the arbitrary order of convictions and the per-
sonal views of the governors.
Daniel Genet*
* This comment is dedicated to my wife Sherry whose love and support helped
to ease the pressures of law school.
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